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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, as coalition forces struggled against a resourceful insurgency in 
Iraq, a team of bankers and lawyers strove to draft the country’s first-ever 
disclosure documents for its commercial debt-for-debt exchange offer. A 
member of the group, frustrated at its inability to write conventional risk 
factors,1 wryly suggested that enclosing an IED (the infamous “improvised 
explosive devices” raging through Baghdad at the time) would be more to the 
point. Morbid as the comment was, it illustrates that Robert Cover’s maxim, 
that “[l]egal interpretation takes place on the field of pain and death,” applies 
also to contexts other than adversarial dispute.2 Not every client, sovereign 
debtor or otherwise, comes with trouble as dramatic as Iraq’s. But every lawyer 
must craft a client’s trouble into a morally persuasive narrative that includes not 
only the detached, rational, and deductive emphasis of modern law, but also the 
swirls of anger, love, and other emotions that advocates from the mythical 
Atticus Finch to ordinary law-firm junior associates sense are indispensable to 
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 1. See, e.g., James Rice, Cleary Advises Iraq on First Eurobond Issue, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 
2006, at 8, 8 (quoting issuer’s counsel as saying, “It was a particular challenge to structure a bond 
transaction where there is no standard disclosure.”). To be clear, recollection indicates that the lawyer 
quoted did not make the comment about IEDs. 
 2. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 
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their mission.3 While legal scholarship often contrasts these two aspects as “law” 
versus “narrative,” in fact, legal narratives meld rational and emotional logic, 
albeit in language that is ideologically inflected to suppress the emotional 
features. Lacking the centralized decisionmaking forum, adversarial format, and 
final arbiter that structure litigation narratives, transactional lawyers must 
mobilize other media to make a persuasive case. For example, a speech crafted 
by counsel and given by Iraq’s then-Minister of Finance in 2004 demonstrates 
how reason and emotion are blended together into a story of suffering and a 
plan to resolve it. The speech became important both for negotiating the legal 
resolution of Iraqi and, arguably, creditors’ suffering when parties gathered at 
the bargaining table, and for transforming that table talk into substantive 
provisions of Iraq’s debt restructuring deal. 
II 
IRAQ AND PROJECT 688 
Between seizing absolute power in 1979 and losing it in 2003, Saddam 
Hussein not only squandered a reserve of forty billion dollars but also 
accumulated a mountain of debt to other governments and private creditors—
ranging from huge construction companies to mom-and-pop trade suppliers.4 
That debt was thrown into default when United Nations sanctions severed 
Iraq’s financial ties to the world after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Following the 
overthrow of Saddam, the new Iraqi government’s accountants eventually 
reconciled breach-of-contract claims against Iraq totaling approximately $140 
billion (including late interest). Next to the country’s ongoing violence, this debt 
was the biggest problem facing the new government. The World Bank 
estimated that even fantastical 33% annual growth would have left Iraq’s debt-
to-GDP ratio at 600% to 900%, many times higher than other, less-devastated 
middle-income borrowers such as Argentina and Russia had recently faced. 
Uncertainty about the fate of this debt stirred political contention inside and 
outside Iraq, notably through an attempt to revive the doctrine of “odious 
debts,”5 and obstructed normalization of Iraq’s economic and financial 
operations, especially rehabilitation of its all-important petroleum sector. As 
 
 3. See, e.g., MAX ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANIZATION OF 
VERBAL INTERACTION IN JUDICIAL SETTINGS 195 (1979) (noting that moral imputation is a more 
regular feature of courtroom talk than everyday conversation); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling 
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2092–93 (1989) (explaining how a discursive shift away from orthodox 
legal “objectivism” and toward emotion, if within doctrinal bounds, can help weak parties win cases). 
 4. See Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Project 688: The Restructuring of Iraq’s Saddam-Era Debt, 
RESTRUCTURING NEWSL. (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Winter 2007, at 
3, 3–9 (providing further background for the information summarized here). 
 5. Groups that organized online include Jubilee Iraq, http://www.jubileeiraq.org, and Probe 
International, http://www.odiousdebts.org. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert M. 
Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007); James V. Feinerman, Odious 
Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 
(Autumn 2007); Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Summer 2007). 
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with other distressed sovereign debtors, lenders hesitated to provide new 
money that might be drained to service old claims. Unlike others, Iraq’s debt 
stock consisted not of a few series of notes or bonds, or a handful of large 
syndicated loans, but of thousands of individual claims held by hundreds of 
varied creditors. Soon after the U.S. administrator ceded power to a sovereign 
Iraqi government on June 28, 2004, the new authorities hired accountants, 
lawyers, and no fewer than four financial institutions to restructure Iraq’s debt 
to manageable levels. The senior law partner on the deal nicknamed the 
assignment “Project 688,” inspired by a randomly generated law-firm code and 
633 Squadron, a classic film about the odds facing fighter pilots ordered to 
destroy a Nazi fortress. 
III 
METHODS: NARRATIVE AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES 
The personal and affective tone imparted to the work of the legal and 
financial experts by the “Project 688” moniker exemplifies a narrative blend 
common in legal discourse. Core attributes of narrative include: (1) an 
instigating “trouble” that prompts reactions, such as a protagonist’s attempts at 
resolution, with consequences that may generate further troubles;6 (2) a tension 
between authenticity—the validation of immediate but inchoate experience—
on one hand, and coherence—the attempt to impose causality and consistency 
on and across experience—on the other, which drives a narrative forward;7 
(3) an implicit recognition of how past, present, and future are bundled together 
in the human experience of time,8 so that narrating the past is a way to assess a 
proposed course of action (and vice versa);9 and (4) some degree of 
“dedicat[ion] to maintaining morality.”10 
 
 6. See Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 16 (1991). 
 7. ELINOR OCHS & LISA CAPPS, LIVING NARRATIVE 284–86 (2001). 
 8. See Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Time, in ON NARRATIVE, 165–86 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981) 
(applying phenomenological theories of temporality to narrative). 
 9. Elinor Ochs, Stories that Step into the Future, in SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
REGISTER 106 (Douglas Biber & Edward Finegan eds., 1994). 
 10. OCHS & CAPPS, supra note 7, at 102. The linguistic anthropological analysis of narrative on 
which this article draws, as exemplified by Ochs and Capps’s book, builds on pioneering work in other 
fields. See generally WILLIAM LABOV & JOSHUA WALETZKY, NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: ORAL 
VERSIONS OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE (1967) (sociolinguistics); MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES 
AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., 1986) (literary theory); MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962) 
(phenomenology). 
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Law is suffused with these narrative qualities.11 Resolving trouble is its 
raison d’être, fitting the personal events of particular cases into generally 
applicable categories is its central tension, sustaining that fit across time by 
coordinating past cases and future harmony is its institutional function, and 
maintaining community moral standards is its normative mandate. Scholars of 
legal narrative often address one or more of these qualities implicitly or 
explicitly.12 Typically, their purpose in doing so is to balance “law” that is purely 
abstract, detached, logical, and deductive—in a word, rational—with a distinct, 
but equally consequential, “narrative” aspect of legal practices that is 
predominantly emotional, personal, or humanistic.13 By contrast, the central 
claim of this article is that rational logic and emotional logic intertwine in the 
construction of a legal narrative as a single unit that unfolds through the 
discourse of legal argumentation and decisionmaking.14 That is, the language of 
legal narratives depends on the merger of abstract, deductive reasoning with the 
emotion familiar from personal narrative. 
This dualistic intertwinement is often concealed by a language ideology of 
the legal profession. Language ideologies, which are as pervasive as language 
itself, refer to the naturalization of only one (or a limited number) of the 
 
 11. “Law” in this article refers to legal traditions recognizably traceable to Roman law or English 
common law, which might be termed “Western.” See RENE DAVID & JOHN C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR 
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 17–25 (3d ed. 1985) (phylogenic explanation and its defense). 
Other systems may have similarly ideological views of narrative as an affective genre often marked by 
gender and inappropriate for legal reasoning. See SUSAN HIRSCH, PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING 
25–33 (1998) (explaining how the use of narrative in Islamic courts in Kenya is considered to be an 
opprobrious, female practice). In addition, contact between systems may produce heterogeneous 
linguistic practices. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION (2008) (discussing the 
blend of Anglo-American and Hopi law in Hopi tribal courts). 
 12. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000); 
WILLIAM CONKLIN, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MODERN LEGAL DISCOURSE (1998); KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICTS AND CASE LAW IN 
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988); JAMES B. 
WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW (1985); Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); 
Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 39 (1994). 
 13. DEREK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 5 (1987) (justifying as nevertheless law-oriented his 
“unorthodox” use of fictional narrative in light of the rationalist strictures of conventional legal genres); 
ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 152–63 (1993) (utilizing a metaphoric contrast of 
empathic “literary woman” with individualistically rational “economic man”); David Ray Papke & 
Kathleen H. McManus, Narrative and the Appellate Opinion, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 449, 450–51 (1999) 
(contrasting experiential, situated “narrative” with abstract, analytic “arguments”); Richard Weisberg, 
Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW’S STORIES 64 (Peter Brooks & Paul 
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (describing the common mantra of “law is narrative” as a display of compassion “as 
against a hard, cold world of legal abstraction”). 
 14. Underlying this claim is the more basic point that factual description and legal discussion “are 
integrally intertwined, shaping and framing one another.” Elizabeth Mertz, Consensus and Dissent in 
U.S. Legal Opinions: Narrative Structure and Social Voices, in DISORDERLY DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE, 
CONFLICT, AND INEQUALITY 135 (Charles L. Briggs, ed., 1996) [hereinafter DISORDERLY 
DISCOURSE]. This observation suggests that they are not distinct analytic units in terms of their 
consequences for legal outcomes. 
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multiple possible meanings to which a piece of language can point.15 When that 
piece of language is put to social use, the naturalized meaning thus organizes 
social relationships in one or another particular way.16 
One powerful naturalization of this kind in law is the fusion of rational logic 
with a more general human tendency to view language as purely referential 
(that is, having a straightforward semantic definition as in a dictionary),17 and 
therefore manipulable in transparent ways. This marriage serves the legal 
preference for universal or at least generally applicable principles. Language 
that appears to be context-dependent becomes marked as emotional and 
inappropriate as a basis for law.18 The Enlightenment project to purge language 
of contextual particulars and create a cosmopolitan discourse of detached 
reason remains a wellspring of this legal ideology.19 Law students continue to be 
professionalized into it as they are encouraged, humiliated, and even 
ventriloquized away from personal reactions like silence, gut feeling, or explicit 
moral claims and toward the exchange of competing referential arguments.20 
 
 15. Michael Silverstein, Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology, in THE ELEMENTS: A 
PARASESSION ON LINGUISTIC UNITS AND LEVELS 195, 204–07 (Paul R. Clyne et al. eds., 1979). 
Language ideologies feature prominently in efforts at standardization, for example, dictionaries and 
legal regulation. See, e.g., ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE, 
IDEOLOGY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 152–70 (1997) (describing how an ideology 
of standard English works against speakers who have an accent in employment discrimination trials). 
 16. Paul V. Kroskrity, Regimenting Languages: Language Ideological Perspectives, in REGIMES OF 
LANGUAGE 1, 5 (Paul V. Kroskrity ed., 2000) [hereinafter REGIMES]; Kathryn A. Woolard, 
Introduction: Language Ideology as a Field of Inquiry, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES 3, 10 (Bambi B. 
Schieffelin et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES]. 
 17. Elizabeth Mertz & Bernard Weissbourd, Legal Ideology and Linguistic Theory: Variability and 
Its Limits, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION 261, 273–76 (Elizabeth Mertz & Richard Parmentier eds., 1985). 
 18. Folk culture’s derision of lawyers as cold-hearted and skilled at twisting words could be 
characterized as an implicit exposure of this professional language ideology, which clearly conflicts with 
nonlawyers’ sense of how language does or should operate. Belying the ideology, scholars have pointed 
out that “relational” narratives are as logical as “rule-oriented” ones. E.g., JOHN M. CONLEY & 
WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS 72–73 (2005) (describing the reception given to courtroom 
testimony delivered in these different styles); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, at xiii, 19, 73 
(2d ed. 1993) (establishing the bases in gender psychology for this bifurcation). 
 19. See RICHARD BAUMAN & CHARLES L. BRIGGS, VOICES OF MODERNITY 29–59 (2003) 
(elaborating how Francis Bacon and John Locke purposefully undertook to reshape the 
conceptualization of language). One ironic early result was the marginalization of the natural law views 
espoused by anti-slavery U.S. judges as mere personal preference during the ascendancy of positivist 
formalism. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22–
30 (1975). 
 20. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” (2007). The ancient tension between law and morality has led to both their 
categorical collapse and their categorical opposition. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
7–8 (2d ed. 1961) (recognizing overlap between law and morality but criticizing jurisprudents since St. 
Augustine for equating them). The legal realists emphasized the opposition as part of their 
methodology. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. LAW REV. 1222, 1251–52 (1931) (defending realists for treating “Is” and “Ought” as analytically 
distinct). Their treatment of the tension as an analytic issue prior to being a normative one may have 
contributed to the identification of morality with the emotional, personal, or humanistic, by mapping 
the distinction between law and morality onto the one between analytic law and those other 
descriptors. Accounts of the Iraqi debt restructuring exhibit this mapping. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & 
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Lawyers and judges perpetuate it.21 And it surfaces in the scholarly bifurcation 
between rational law and emotional narrative discussed above.22 
This bifurcation nonetheless is illusory. It is structurally possible to suppress, 
but not to eliminate, the context-dependent meanings of language that are 
concealed by the focus on a naturalized referential meaning.23 The inherent 
multiplicity within language is part of what makes it possible for people to 
express and debate the conflicts that underlie legal discourse.24 Legal texts 
themselves are impossible to read without this multiplicity.25 Furthermore, it is 
increasingly well-established that human cognition and its social expression 
depend on concurrent rational and emotional operations.26 From a cognitive 
psychology perspective, the dichotomy between rational law and personal 
narrative may be a false one.27 
As a result, this language ideology takes shape within legal narratives as a 
lopsided dichotomy that valorizes the ostensibly referential expression of 
rational logic and suppresses context-dependent emotional logic, although both 
persist together. This pattern is evident in the speech by the Iraqi finance 
minister. Grammatically, the connection between syntax and semantics 
 
G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debt and Nation-Building: When the Incubus Departs, 60 MAINE L. REV. 478, 
484 (2000) (quoting Iraqi officials who spoke contrastingly of the “legal” grounds of odious debt and 
the “moral” grounds of odious regime). 
 21. See, e.g., GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY 21–24, 37–44, 
227–30 (2001) (showing how courtroom interaction among rape trial participants distributes gender-
based evaluations as to “legally valid” versus “suspect” actions according to a “patriarchal logic of 
sexual rationality”; and criticizing rape-law reformers for replicating this orientation); Charles 
Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 606, 618 (1994) (examining how defense 
attorneys for the police officers who beat Rodney King diced and spliced the video to construct an 
ostensibly rational narrative of escalating resistance and response); John Haviland, Ideologies of 
Language: Some Reflections on Language and U.S. Law, 105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 764, 767–68 
(2003) (demonstrating a U.S. trial judge’s problematic faith in unproblematic, “referentially 
transparent” translation). 
 22. Professional ideologies of language are as pervasive as any other (and undoubtedly lurk in the 
present article). See Paul V. Kroskrity, Language Ideologies in the Expression and Representation of 
Arizona Tewa Identity, in REGIMES, supra note 16, at 330 (examining the ideologies that framed a mid-
century Native American anthropologist’s study of speakers of his ancestral language). 
 23. JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 208 (1967) (arguing that the attempt to 
suppress one half of a binary pair ironically ensures its intellectual persistence); Michael Silverstein, 
The Uses and Utility of Ideology: A Commentary, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES, supra note 16, at 123, 
138–39 (explaining that ideological layers to language go “all the way down”). 
 24. Charles L. Briggs, Introduction, in DISORDERLY DISCOURSE, supra note 14, at 3, 3–4, 13–16 
(explaining how competing narratives of a conflict can deploy the indexical and iconic functions of 
language to complicate referential meaning). 
 25. See JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL 
CRITICISM, at x–xi, 28–34 (1990) (discussing the context-dependence of rational logic and providing an 
example from the Federalist Papers). It is evident that the ideological tendency to treat narrative as 
extralegal nevertheless remains strong within legal scholarship. See RICHLAND, supra note 11, at 117–
18 (reviewing debates over the relationship between law and narrative and identifying numerous gaps 
and inconsistencies within that debate). 
 26. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); JONATHAN LEAR, LOVE AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE (1990). 
 27. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 106 (2001). 
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accomplishes two narrative effects.28 First, the grammar invokes past 
categorized narratives (precedents) to build a rational case for a desired action. 
Second, the grammar contextualizes the present undecided narrative (the 
problem) in emotional terms to make the negative case against a failure to act 
as desired (that is, leaving the problem un-rationalized).29 
Rather than a bifurcation between narrative style and legal substance,30 style 
and substance are both present in each strand of the parallel structure of 
rational and emotional logics. Parallelism gives language its poetic qualities,31 
which, in turn, undergird rhetorical persuasion.32 Striking the right (lopsided) 
balance between reason and emotion helps persuade an audience steeped in the 
professional ideology but also attuned to linguistic cues about emotion that are 
essential to interpretation and response.33 First, these cues can signal an appeal 
to empathetic solidarity and remind listeners of shared values they would want 
vindicated in their own lives.34 The balance between rational action and 
emotional inaction also facilitates the distribution of moral responsibility for 
Iraq’s predicament and its resolution across parties.35 Second, the performance 
 
 28. See infra Figure 1. The modifier, “meta-pragmatic,” in that table means “talk about talk.” See 
Carlo L. Prevignano & Aldo di Luzio, A Discussion with John J. Gumperz, in LANGUAGE AND 
INTERACTION 7, 15–16 (Susan L. Eerdmans et al. eds., 2003) (interviewing linguistic anthropologist 
John Gumperz). The meta-pragmatic level of language is the one that “regiments” underlying grammar 
into moral and ideological outcomes. Michael Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic 
Function, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE: REPORTED SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATICS 47–48 (John A. 
Lucy ed., 1993). 
 29. Contrast this division with the characterization in AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at 
45–47, 108, 122, of both precedent and cases-at-hand as dependent on paradigmatic categorization. The 
chronological focal point and author may matter. Supreme Court Justices’ opinions are acts of decision 
that perform the work of turning present cases into past precedent. This imperative may conceal just 
how contingent a pending controversy’s fit with a precedential category is. By contrast, this article 
addresses an advocate’s more urgent earlier moment of persuasively making the case, at which point 
the outcome is uncertain. 
 30. See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 
7–11 (1992) (decrying an entrenched “dichotomy” between narrative and law while still distinguishing 
narrative “style” from legal “substance”). 
 31. See Roman Jakobson, Grammatical Parallelism and Its Russian Facet, 42 LANGUAGE 399, 399 
(1966) (noting the cross-cultural fundamentality of parallelism). 
 32. See KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 101–02 (1966) (arguing against the 
claim that rhetorics and poetics are mutually exclusive); STEVEN C. CATON, “PEAKS OF YEMEN I 
SUMMON”: POETICS AS CULTURAL PRACTICE IN A NORTH YEMENI TRIBE 155–56 (1990) (drawing on 
Burke to outline an inherent connection between poetics, persuasion, and politics). 
 33. See Elinor Ochs & Bambi Schieffelin, Language Has a Heart, 9 TEXT 7, 9 (1989) (arguing that 
people need to be able to “convey and assess” emotion in order to “interpret and respond to” semantic 
arguments). 
 34. See Douglas Hollan & C. Jason Throop, Whatever Happened to Empathy?: Introduction, 36 
ETHOS 385, 391–92 (2008) (noting that emotion is central to affording empathetic responses, though the 
latter may be used to harm as much as to help); Joseph Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442, 
2453–56 (1989) (arguing that both empathy and introspection are indispensable components of 
persuasion). 
 35. See ALESSANDRO DURANTI, FROM GRAMMAR TO POLITICS 144–45 (1994) (arguing that 
ascribing agency to good and bad actions in grammatically different ways helps constitute social and 
political structure). 
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of that balance through the rhetoric of the minister’s speech was a key 
demonstration of his—and, by extension, Iraq’s—viability as a legitimate and 
trustworthy contractual partner.36 In sum, both the style and the substance of 
persuasion unfold narratively through the poetics of the ideological 
configuration of rational and emotional logics. The speech, which consumed 
substantial resources to produce and deliver, helped establish a persuasive 
framework for the eventual terms of the debt restructuring deal.37  
 
 Figure 1: Moral Persuasion in Legal Narrative 
 Syntactic Form Semantic and Pragmatic Target 
Meta-Pragmatic 
Indexicality 
Rational Logic 
Categorize current 
case according to 
precedent 
Attain desirable 
result 
Rational framing 
of events: Call to 
action 
Emotional Logic 
Configure current 
case as outside 
categorical bounds 
Avoid 
undesirable 
result 
Affective framing 
of events: 
Warning 
 
IV 
A SPEECH ON THE SEINE 
On November 17, 2004, the Secretariat of the Paris Club, an informal 
grouping of creditor countries,38 formally opened debt restructuring negotiations 
between the Republic of Iraq and nineteen other states.39 On the table were a 
plurality of the debt claims against Iraq, which, when reconciled, totaled over 
fifty-one billion dollars. If the Club’s fractious membership could agree on the 
terms of a deal that Iraq also would accept, the Club’s “comparable treatment” 
requirement (its version of a most-favored-nation clause) would effectively 
shield Iraq in other negotiations by preventing it from giving better repayment 
terms to any other contractual creditor. Minister of Finance Adil Abdul-
Mahdi’s brief (fewer than one-thousand words) opening remarks set forth 
Iraq’s view of the scene and the stakes.40 
 
 36. See MICHAEL HERZFELD, CULTURAL INTIMACY: SOCIAL POETICS IN THE NATION-STATE 
141–45 (1997) (equating social interaction and organization with rhetoric). 
 37. Cf. Donald Brenneis, Telling Troubles: Narrative, Conflict, and Experience, in DISORDERLY 
DISCOURSE, supra note 14, at 41, 49 (contending that the act of narration during conflicts “engenders 
and transforms social experience”). 
 38. See Club de Paris, http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). 
 39. One of the nineteen left negotiations before the parties reached an accord. 
 40. Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Iraq, Address at a Meeting of the 
Paris Club (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). Reports indicate the 
minister stuck to the script. Because the speech was delivered orally, a complete account of what 
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In the first substantive lines of the speech, the minister laid out the problem 
in terms that interweave the logics of reason and emotion: 
What is at stake here is whether the Republic of Iraq will be able quickly to recover 
from the horrors of three wars, the corruption and brutality of the Saddam regime, 
and the social instability that has followed the overthrow of Saddam. If Iraq can 
recover—quickly and convincingly—great benefits will flow to the Middle East region 
and to the rest of the world. But if Iraq remains paralyzed by continuing social and 
political instability, the cost to all of us will be unimaginably high.41 
First, the problem itself is framed in moral terms loaded with affective 
markers: horror, corruption, brutality, instability, unimaginably high costs, and, 
twice, the name Saddam, which the discourse surrounding the 1990 Gulf War 
made synonymous with evil for many people around the world.42 
Second, the minister frames proposals for addressing the problem in 
rational, consequence-oriented terms. The subjunctive bifurcation of possible 
end results is a narrative device called “sideshadowing.”43 Each if–then phrase 
reproduces an ideal form of deductive reasoning. By juxtaposing them, the 
minister gives his interlocutors a clear consequence-oriented choice, either 
“great benefits” or “unimaginably high costs,” depending on whether and how 
they choose to reduce Iraq’s debt burden. The stress on “can recover” conveys 
both the contingency and the desirability of the first possibility. The 
undesirability of the second possible outcome is conveyed by the negative, 
affective descriptions of “remain[ing] paralyzed” and “unimaginably high 
costs.” 
Third, the redeployment of the emotional logic set forth in the passage’s 
first sentence to undermine the undesirable possibility in its final sentence 
points to a category problem the minister had to overcome throughout his 
speech. The simplest approach to negotiations would have been to request one 
of the Paris Club’s existing standard packages, such as “Cologne” or “Lyon” 
 
happened in the meeting would ideally include a description of how the audience shaped it before, 
during, and after delivery. See Alessandro Duranti, The Audience as Co-author: An Introduction, 6 
TEXT 239, 240–43 (1986) (describing how the meaning of an oration depends substantially on real-time 
audience activities and interpretations). Those details are not available. However, reading written legal 
texts also generates meaning dynamically and interactively. JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE 
THEIR MEANING 18 (1984). More people read the speech more times and in more varied contexts than 
heard it in Paris. 
 41. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40 (emphasis in original). 
 42. By 2004, English-speaking media often referred to the Iraqi leader as simply “Saddam.” See, 
e.g., Blair Shewchuk, Saddam or Mr. Hussein?, CBC NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 2003), http://www.cbc.ca. 
news/indepth/words/saddam_hussein.html (investigating the reasons). The use of first names in English 
usually indicates solidarity, affiliation, or allegiance. D.J. Allerton, Proper Names and Definite 
Descriptions with the Same Reference: A Pragmatic Choice for Language Users, 25 J. PRAGMATICS 621, 
622, 632 (1996). The use of “Saddam,” which is taken by English speakers to be a first name regardless 
of Arabic convention in Iraq, appears to be a hyperbolically performative subversion of this practice to 
convey non-alignment instead. 
 43. GARY S. MORSON, NARRATIVE AND FREEDOM 40–41 (1994). Subjunctivity in legal narrative 
creates space to advance counterfactual arguments. See Cover, supra note 12, at 4–5 (positing narrative 
as the force that connects legal norms to both actuality and possibility). 
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terms.44 However, at the time, no country had ever received the massive level of 
debt reduction Iraq was seeking, leaving no categorical basis for rational 
comparison. The failure of numerous poor, conflict-ridden countries to 
transform their emotionally compelling cases into such a precedent meant that 
an emotion-based moral warning also was unlikely to persuade creditors.45 By 
setting forth an emotional appeal based on the awful present, offering two 
alternative outcomes based on rational if–then logic, and making one of those 
alternatives loop back to the terrible present, the minister enlists rational logic 
to emphasize how bad it would be to leave Iraq in such a highly specific and 
uncategorized context, without having to concede that Iraq’s circumstances 
merited exceptional treatment. Later in the speech, the minister similarly 
addresses concerns that Iraq’s untapped oil wealth mitigated the need to cut its 
debt. His response again is constructed as a rational choice (“We can either 
devote our resources to repaying Saddam era debts, or we can apply those 
resources toward rebuilding Iraq’s oil production capacity for the common 
benefit”),46 with an affective marker (the “Saddam era”) leading one possibility 
back to the problematic present. 
The minister recasts this double-stranded story from his opening passage 
two additional times, in two subsections explicitly separated in the written text.47 
In the first, the minister disclaims the interjection of an Iraqi narrative or using 
it as a justification: “We all know the motivations that led Saddam to 
accumulate this debt, and we all know how he spent the money. I am not going 
to retell that story here or draw any conclusions from it.”48 Leaving unspoken 
the affective experience of the Iraqi people (which, as a former exile, includes 
his own) pays lip service to the language ideology of impersonal reference while 
creating a powerful rhetorical effect through the presupposition of a shared 
truth. This truth is evinced by the phrase, “we all know,” which is used twice, 
and sedimented by the minister’s refusal to “retell” the story, which implies a 
first telling that already happened and was accepted. Through this ostensibly 
 
 44. See Club de Paris, supra note 38. 
 45. See, e.g., Gumisai Mutuma, Africa Struggles for Global Attention, 17 AFR. RECOVERY 10 
(2003) (expressing concern that international attention on the crisis in Iraq was “sidelining” Africa), 
available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no2/172iraq.htm; Craig Smith, Major 
Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004 (noting the unprecedented 
nature of Iraq’s final Paris Club deal, which in fact gave less relief than some Club members initially 
wished), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/22/international/middleeast/22debt.html; Charles 
Mutasa, Global Apartheid and African Debt Crisis (Life Over Debt, Discussion Paper Series Issue 3, 
2005) (accusing the U.S. government of racial hypocrisy for supporting debt relief for Iraq that it had 
not advocated for sub-Saharan African countries), available at http://www.afsc.org/ 
AfricaLifeOverDebt/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/43866. This public commentary directly challenged 
Iraq’s worthiness in comparison with other debilitated states. Some drew on more distant historical 
precedents more favorable to Iraq. See infra text accompanying note 70. 
 46. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 47. Listeners may not have appreciated these subdivisions, although a pause by the speaker at the 
written dividing points may have conveyed the separation aurally. The speech was later posted onto a 
website for the Trade Association for Emerging Markets. 
 48. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
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transparent presupposition and non-telling of the story, its moral basis is not 
opened up to evaluation by the audience. 
Lest there be doubt, the minister supplies the correct evaluative stance with 
the admonition contained in the first four words of the subsequent sentence: 
“But everyone should recognize that unlike countries whose borrowings finance 
growth and development, Saddam borrowed much of this money to make war 
upon his neighbors, to threaten the international community and to oppress his 
own people.”49 From the strictly rational point of view presented in the if–then 
clauses in the speech’s opening passage, Saddam’s reasons and uses should not 
matter to the resolution of the problem. Either the debt is reduced, to 
everyone’s benefit, or it is not, to everyone’s detriment. In addition, a main 
reason the Iraqi Government and its advisors took great pains to distance 
themselves from the odious debt “doctrine” was the difficulty of distilling its 
heavily emotional–moral grammar into rational, deductive terms.50 By 
nevertheless invoking that grammar using a rhetorically effective three-part 
list—make war, threaten, and oppress51—the minister appeals obliquely to the 
audience’s morality. It is both oblique and an appeal to moral action because of 
the grammatical mood marker “should recognize” (the only one of its type in 
the speech), which implies truth–value dependent on human control.52 He also 
sets up a moral counterpoint to private creditors’ anticipated claims for 
preferential treatment because their goods or services went to education, 
healthcare, or civilian infrastructure. 
Finally, as with his opening passage, the minister focuses his direct appeal in 
ideologically preferred terms: 
Only three things about Iraq’s debt stock need to be highlighted for present purposes: 
First, it is gargantuan in size. . . . [T]he debt claims against Iraq total at least $125 
billion. . . . Second, a debt stock that size is visibly unsustainable under any scenario. 
Third, for so long as that debt stock—or any significant part of it—remains in place, 
Iraq will not be able to attract the investment it needs . . . .53 
These enumerated “realities,”54 as the minister subsequently calls them, 
connect in an ideologically preferred chain of fact-based reasoning that 
combines a mathematical figure and the technocratic term “unsustainable” to 
reach the conclusion that brute economics minimally requires categorization of 
 
 49. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 50. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 5 (discussing the adjudicative difficulties caused 
by the moral ambiguities of the odious debt doctrine). 
 51. See Gail Jefferson, List-Construction as a Task and Resource, in INTERACTION COMPETENCE 
63–66, 68, 73 (George Psathas ed., 1990), for the “programmatic relevance” of three-part lists in 
everyday conversation. 
 52. See RANDOLPH QUIRK ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
§ 4.49, at 219–20 (1985) (comparing intrinsic and extrinsic modality (the formal term for such mood 
markers)). 
 53. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 54. Lists have rhetorical qualities that reinforce rational logic and distance texts from emotional 
logic. Cf. Deborah Schiffrin, Making a List, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 377, 380–84 (1994) (discussing 
the functional contrast between lists and narratives). 
DEEB 11/25/2010 
120 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:109 
Iraq within the class of countries that have already obtained Paris Club debt 
reduction deals.55 
In the second subsection of the speech, labeled “The Logic” in the written 
text, the minister reiterates the duality of rationality and emotion. In this, the 
heart of the speech, he leads with the preferred rational logic: “The logic behind 
eliminating the large majority of this debt stock is compelling. The potential 
costs to the international community of continued instability in Iraq are 
unthinkably high. This is not a national or even a regional problem; it is a global 
problem.”56 The first sentence sets forth the need to act in ideologically 
preferred terms by asserting compelling “logic,” in its conventional reason-
based connotation. The second sentence cements this consequence-orientation 
by offering the disfavored affective alternative, “unthinkably high” costs 
(echoing the “unimaginably high” costs in the speech’s opening passage). 
Against the backdrop of the first two sentences, the third sentence compresses 
the three narrative features of trouble, tension between authenticity and 
coherence, and temporality to effectuate the fourth feature, a moral stance. The 
rhetorical effect of the repetition of “problem” in the third sentence is 
enhanced by its change in valence and scale from not “national” to not 
“regional” to, in fact, “global.” Repetition is a rhetorical technique used to 
evoke a coherent vision of the world, which in this case builds toward a literal 
declaration of a global problem.57 Embedded within this rhetoric, the noun, 
“problem,” is not offered as a standalone assertion (“this is a problem”), but as 
already modified by either “national or regional” or “global,” which 
immediately situates the trouble in one or another presupposed categorical 
narrative: national–regional troubles versus global troubles. The selection of 
“global problem” unites speaker and audience in several ways. First, it aligns 
their temporal experience by implying a shared resource of past precedent 
 
 55. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) produces “debt sustainability” analyses. In fact, Iraq’s 
was deemed to require much greater debt reduction than other countries’ previous restructurings. 
Euromoney implicitly exposed the rational-emotional ideological contour when it reported that 
“[f]ormer [Paris] Club chairman [Jean-Pierre] Jouyet says that ‘even if you are politically minded, all 
the decisions in the Paris Club are based on debt sustainability calculations made by the IMF, and we 
are very strict on this point.’ But it’s very easy to be sceptical about the Fund’s debt sustainability 
analysis for Iraq, not least because it’s based on an oil price of $26 a barrel.” Felix Salmon, Paris Club 
Members Adapt to New Rules, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 212. 
 56. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 57. See Deborah Tannen, Repetition in Conversation: Toward a Poetics of Talk, 63 LANGUAGE 
574, 576 (1987) (arguing that repetition in speech provides coherence to discourse and therefore to the 
message that discourse conveys). It is formulated here as another three-part contrastive list, which can 
be an especially powerful combination in political speechmaking. See John Heritage & David 
Greatbatch, Generating Applause: A Study of Rhetoric and Response at Party Political Conferences, 92 
AM. J. SOC. 110, 116–17, 122–27 (1986) (extending Atkinson’s discussion of contrasts and lists in 
political speeches); Jefferson, supra note 51 (concerning tripartite lists). A similar narrative tactic can 
be seen in President Johnson’s 1965 “We Shall Overcome” speech, in which he declared, “There is no 
Negro problem. There is no Southern problem. There is no Northern problem. There is only an 
American problem.” President Lyndon Johnson, Address to the U.S. Congress (Mar. 15, 1965). 
President Johnson, like Minister Abdul-Mahdi, was making a political speech to achieve a legal 
objective (in his case, civil rights legislation). 
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(previous global problems) and solutions (how those problems were resolved). 
Second, it seeks to circumvent the narrative tension between authenticity and 
coherence by universalizing Iraq’s problems, which echoes the strategy earlier 
in the speech of presupposing that “we all know” the cause of Iraq’s misery. 
Finally, these referential connotations are complemented by the fact that a 
global problem is also personal to everyone, which pre-empts the need to 
provide a justification for addressing the trouble. 
In the remainder of the second subsection, the minister expands his dualistic 
theme in a series of sentences that alternate between a declarative deductive 
chain that leads to the desired result of massive debt relief and affectively 
marked alternatives if the relief is not forthcoming. To illustrate this narrative 
tactic, use of the first theme in the following excerpt is marked A and use of the 
second theme B, with the conclusion labeled C: 
A Stability in Iraq will require a massive reconstruction effort . . . 
A That reconstruction effort will require all the resources that Iraq can generate . . . 
B But those resources . . . will be painfully inadequate . . . 
A Iraq must receive large investments from the private sector . . . 
B It is fanciful to believe that Iraq will be able to attract those investments . . . 
A The existing debt stock must therefore be drastically reduced . . . 
A [W]ithout robust recovery, instability in Iraq may continue. 
B [T]he costs of that instability will be felt by everyone. 
C Writing off these Saddam era claims is a relatively inexpensive way to reduce the 
risk that the world will have to confront the costs of dealing with continued instability 
in Iraq and the region.58 
The abstract, rational chain of A sentences is driven by the repeated use of 
grammatical mood markers that mark statements as independent of human 
control for their truth-value:59 will require, must receive, must be reduced, and 
may continue.60 By contrast, the dominant feature of the B sentences is 
ideologically disfavored affective markers—painful, fanciful, believe, attract, 
 
 58. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 59. See QUIRK ET AL., supra note 52, at 219–20 (comparing intrinsic and extrinsic modality). 
 60. The last A line incorporates elements of emotional logic by referring to the existing political 
instability that may continue absent economic recovery. To complete the overall rational chain 
culminating in the C conclusion, it was necessary to laminate the A and B lines. At the time of the 
speech, debt reduction was still a counterfactual situation. Inverting the last A line into the negative, 
existing scenario allows that line to import emotional elements and creates a hook for the last B line so 
that together they drive toward the conclusion. This counterfactual situation might explain why the last 
A line has a relatively downgraded mood of “may continue” rather than the more forceful “will 
continue.” It may have seemed unpersuasively presumptuous to assert rather than merely predict 
continuing chaos. However, Iraqi officials subsequently did assert that debt reduction was a necessary 
condition for the return of stability. See Ali A. Allawi, Why Iraq’s Debt Deal Makes Sense, 
EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 213 (writing, “I do not for a moment want to suggest that debt relief is a 
sufficient condition for social and political stability to return to Iraq. But it is certainly a necessary 
condition.”). 
DEEB 11/25/2010 
122 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:109 
and felt—that reinforce the negative alternative if debt relief is not granted. The 
fugal alternation of themes in this passage highlights how both the rational and 
emotional logics have narrative potential through parallel structure. The 
former’s lead and latter’s echo of words like resources, investments, and 
instability reinforce the lopsided ideological preference for rational over 
emotional logic. The force of both themes combines in the concluding C 
sentence, where the subjunctive risk warned of in the B sentences can be 
diminished by a solution based on the A sentences. 
Only at the end of his speech, which is separated by five asterisks and the 
subheading “Conclusion” in the written text, does the minister explicitly engage 
emotional logic. Yet even here, the emotional and personal aspects of the 
narrative, which the minister expresses as “political,” are couched as an 
objective “observation” he makes about the emotional state of his people: 
Allow me to make one further observation of a political nature. The Iraqi people 
regard themselves as the principal victim of the Saddam regime. They also look upon 
the debts that Saddam accumulated as one aspect of that victimization—an aspect that 
unfortunately will continue to haunt the people of Iraq for decades to come. Although 
the Interim Government wishes to behave responsibly in settling these issues, no 
Government in Iraq can ignore the deeply-held sentiments of the Iraqi people 
concerning these claims.61  
It is common for speakers to fragment and distribute social responsibility by 
framing their words as coming from other people.62 The minister extends this 
practice by ascribing an emotional state to the Iraqi people. Doing so distances 
himself and the Interim Government from the barely veiled threat in the last 
sentence. That threat is the one instance in his speech in which consequence-
oriented logic is explicitly framed in emotional terms. 
Each section of the minister’s speech employs the core features of narrative 
as a scaffold for a legal language ideology that emphasizes reference-oriented 
rational logic and suppresses context-dependent emotional logic. The 
interweaving of those logics results in one cohesive narrative about the Iraqi 
debt crisis. That narrative is both a story and a plan. 
V 
TALK INTO MONEY 
The minister’s speech was not confined to its specific place, moment, and 
linguistic genre. Delivering it was necessarily a speech-act that equally 
necessarily nestled within a logic of intertextual relationships.63 Constructing 
 
 61. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40 (emphases added). 
 62. See MARJORIE H. GOODWIN, HE-SAID-SHE-SAID: TALK AS SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AMONG 
BLACK CHILDREN 90 (1990) (expanding Goffman’s seminal account of how speakers animate third 
parties to include not only direct attribution of others’ talk or actions but also how others are situated 
socially by virtue of where they are or identifying characteristics). 
 63. See WILLIAM F. HANKS, INTERTEXTS: WRITINGS ON LANGUAGE, UTTERANCE, AND 
CONTEXT 111, 168, 172 (2000) (explaining that a text is a “mode of social action” that has 
communicative relevance largely by virtue of being “situated within a larger network” of texts); John 
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Iraq’s debt situation in language ideological terms was only the first step; 
implementing those terms on the ground had to follow.64 The narrative begun at 
the Paris Club in 2004 continued after an accord was reached, as attention 
turned in 2005 to making a deal with Iraq’s hundreds of private creditors. The 
message in the minister’s opening remarks was adapted across additional public 
statements that counsel shaped; among these were the minister’s closing 
remarks at the November 2004 Club meeting; interviews by him and Central 
Bank of Iraq Governor Sinan Al-Shabibi in Euromoney; an article in that 
journal by Dr. Abdul-Mahdi’s successor, Ali A. Allawi; financial officials’ 
speeches at a forum for large private creditors held in Dubai in May 2005; and 
various smaller-group meetings and phone calls.65 The narrative also flowed into 
the contracts and other formal documents of the debt restructuring program 
itself. 
For example, the basic terms of any debt reduction agreement with private 
creditors were set by the comparable treatment provision of the Paris Club 
accord. This achievement overcame the category problem that faced the 
minister at the outset of his speech: the Paris Club deal operated as a precedent 
upon which Iraq could draw in rational terms in negotiations with its private 
creditors. At the same time, comparable treatment did not determine every 
detail, including the calculation of late interest, which had significant financial 
implications because of the long lapse since default in 1990. To calculate the 
amount of debt owed prior to cutting it, late interest on Paris Club debt claims 
was reconciled according to the contractual terms, whereas late interest for 
private creditors was subjected to a uniform rate regardless of the accounting 
method and amount of past-due interest a private creditor had applied to each 
individual claim.66 This policy, together with a specialized arbitration 
mechanism, was the most unusual compared to other debt restructurings, 
sovereign or otherwise. 
 
Searle, What is a Speech Act?, in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 221, 221–22 (Max Black ed., 1965) (arguing 
that linguistic communication is irreducibly composed of both a stretch of language and its socially 
effective production). 
 64. See Susan U. Philips, Constructing a Tongan Nation-State through Ideology in the Courtroom, in 
REGIMES, supra note 16, 229, at 244–45 (layering secondary sites of meta-pragmatic commentary that 
create language ideologies (such as courts) on top of primary sites in which those language ideologies 
are used in everyday life). 
 65. See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Restructuring Debt Is Top Priority, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2004, at 72 
(interviewing Minister Abdul-Mahdi on the subject of the debt before the Paris Club meeting); Allawi, 
supra note 60, at 210 (promising that Iraq would “vigorously” work to complete its debt restructuring, 
in narrative terms that often recapitulated Minister Abdul-Mahdi’s opening remarks); Kathryn Wells, 
Iraq Restructures Saddam Debt, EUROMONEY, Feb. 2006, at 54 (reporting on the stages leading up to 
Iraq’s “ground-breaking” debt-for-debt exchange and noting Dr. Al-Shabibi’s role in overseeing the 
process). Others, of course, constructed their own narratives of these events. See, e.g., How the Iraq 
Deal Was Done, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 210 (reading Iraq’s Paris Club accord against a longer 
political history of Paris Club deals, and emphasizing the role of individual political leadership in 
cementing the Iraq accord). 
 66. Some Paris Club members voluntarily applied a uniform rate in accordance with their own 
policies. 
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Some creditors, including powerful institutions and their influential leaders, 
reacted angrily. They typically argued either that contracts must be honored or 
that their claims were for debt incurred for civilian purposes. These arguments 
had both rational and emotional features. Within the dominant global narrative 
of Iraqi political history since 1990, the claim concerning civilian use is a 
relatively straightforward referential contrast between civilian–good and 
military–bad. Precisely because of that narrative, the claim that the contract 
must be honored is trickier. Classical speech-act theory would support it on the 
basis that a promise commits a promisor, regardless of context.67 An op-ed in 
The New York Times adopted this view, dismissing even “prudent” (rational) 
arguments that punitive financial burdens can backfire because Iraq “must 
respect one of the first principles of the rule of law: contracts should be 
honored.”68 The emotional logic of the creditors’ arguments surfaced in 
individuals’ patent fury and through the emphasis on fairness, which law 
training treats as non-legal and emotional.69 
The narrative established by Minister Abdul-Mahdi’s opening remarks to 
the Paris Club foreshadowed Iraq’s response in several ways. First, as noted in 
section IV, the Iraqis emphasized the oppressive aspects of Saddam Hussein’s 
profligacy, so that the emotional costs far outweighed any benefits. Second, 
because Iraqi debt had been in payment default for fifteen years, over which 
time late interest compounded, Iraq’s advisors pointed out that even small 
differences in how creditors booked that interest could lead to much more 
dramatic divergences in debt sums than would have been predicted when the 
contracts were made. This rational arithmetic counter-principle supported the 
emotional counter-argument that the uniform rate better adhered to the 
principle of intercreditor equity. The speech less directly presages this 
argument—it was not designed to—but the categorical appeal to Iraq’s debt as 
a “global problem” initiates a theme of solidarity. Iraq’s representatives and 
friends also deployed this theme to remind creditors of disastrous alternative 
precedents, most infamously the dispute over German reparations after the 
First World War.70 Finally and most decisively, the Iraqis stressed that time was 
of the essence. It was difficult enough to reconcile more than eleven thousand 
individual private debt claims, but to investigate the circumstances of each claim 
would have been infinitely time-consuming and adjudicatively complex, if not 
impossible. The minister’s speech in 2004 repeatedly hit the theme of rapid 
motion toward the future rather than bogging down in the present. He 
contrasted Iraq’s need to “recover quickly” with it “remaining paralyzed” and 
 
 67. See generally John H. Searle, How To Derive “Ought” from “Is”, 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 
43 (1964) (acknowledging, however, that extenuating circumstances could negate the promise). 
 68. Mark Medish, Make Baghdad Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/opinion/make-baghdad-pay.html. 
 69. See MERTZ, supra note 20, at 121. Of course, like all aspects of morality, fairness remains a 
factor when the ultimate bases for the legal system are under discussion. 
 70. See, e.g., Medish, supra note 68 (citing Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz’s view that failure to 
cancel Iraqi debt would repeat the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles). 
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“remaining in place” and with its “continued instability.” These terms exhibit a 
subtle but grammatically remarkable shade of the rational–emotional 
distinction. The active verb “recover” links the desirable outcome to 
consequence-oriented, future-looking motion, while the present progressive 
tense of the other verbs connects the undesirable possibility to Iraq’s specific, 
problematic circumstances. 
The speech is even more explicit. Its last substantive sentence emphasizes 
the urgency in a final deployment of rational if–then logic: “In short, if we all 
wish to settle this problem, we must do it now . . . .”71 That problem, of course, 
was global. Establishing this urgency early on in ideologically persuasive form 
helped to overcome resistance when the commercial-claim reconciliation terms 
were announced. The Iraq debt restructuring team even rationalized creditors’ 
complaints by re-narrating their individual emotional–moral appeals in 
generalized referential terms. The team devised a standard letter to respond to 
any such complaint, erasing each creditor’s personal narrative.72 While not 
entirely determined in advance, the way in which Iraq’s debt restructuring 
narrative took actionable shape at the negotiating table in Paris later became a 
basis for translating those negotiations into specific substantive provisions of 
the debt restructuring deal. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The legal tale of Iraq’s debt restructuring program—and there must be no 
mistake that this was a legal tale, for at the end of the day, the program is 
represented by a thick set of binding contracts covering tens of billions of 
dollars and hundreds of parties—is one that participants themselves narrated. 
They strove to mediate the tension between authenticity and coherence and 
between morality and law within the bounds imposed by the ideological 
requirements of legal discourse. One such requirement that appears to cut 
across many legal narratives, and stands out in the speech analyzed above, is the 
construction of a particular rhetorical configuration of reason and emotion. This 
process is neither insincere nor self-contradictory. Whatever purposeful artistry 
these kinds of speech-acts involve, they also reflect deeply ingrained linguistic 
habits regulated by a system of social rewards and punishments.73 Much as 
 
 71. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
 72. Language ideologies tend to “erase” “facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme,” 
including by homogenizing situations that do not fit. Judith Irvine & Susan Gal, Language Ideology and 
Linguistic Differentiation, in REGIMES, supra note 16, at 35, 38. Not unfeelingly, the standard letter was 
dubbed the “Naked City letter,” after the dispiriting metropolitan tagline to the eponymous TV series 
(earlier a film), “There are eight million stories in the Naked City. This has been one of them.” See Lee 
C. Buchheit, Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 10 BUS. L. INT’L 211, 211 n.16 
(2009) (reproducing a similar response by Iraq’s Central Bank Governor to a creditor’s committee). 
 73. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 37–38 (Gino Raymond & Matthew 
Adamson trans., Polity Press 1991) (1982) (situating individualistic linguistic acts on a field of social 
competence governed by habitus and a “market” of “sanctions and censorships”). 
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Galileo’s science was not solely the product of laboratory-based conviction, but 
also developed through the performance of scientific philosophy in the morally 
approved Renaissance-court style (sprezzatura),74 legal professionals’ practices 
blend referential argumentation and social contextualization according to 
norms of lawyerly performance. 
Effective performances draw on specific cultural knowledge,75 the mastery of 
which often endows specialized elites such as lawyers with a particular role in 
narrative construction. Clients may benefit even more from lawyers’ inside 
knowledge of a system and its players than from counsel’s command of abstract 
legal principles.76 In Iraq’s case, the Paris Club itself was negotiating between a 
history of feudal procedures reminiscent of The Wizard of Oz on one hand,77 
and its increasingly institutionalized role in rationalizing international economic 
relations on the other.78 Iraq’s counsel used background knowledge of the Paris 
Club to insist that their clients would neither sleep nor eat in the basement nor 
address the Club through pages or Dumas-esque secret messages. Minister 
Abdul-Mahdi made his opening remarks not as supplicant, but as a member of 
the rational discursive community: “My colleagues and I have met privately 
with many of you over the past few months, and I believe there is a strong 
consensus that these are indeed the realities now facing Iraq and its creditors.”79 
Here, “meeting privately” suggests conferral among equals; “consensus” 
invokes an express Paris Club principle, demonstrating expert knowledge; 
“realities” are referential facts; and Iraq and its creditors are described as facing 
them collectively. That sentence combines cultural knowledge and language 
 
 74. See generally MARIO BIAGIOLI, GALILEO, COURTIER (1993). Compare U.S. politics, where 
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 78. The Club’s first-ever annual report in 2007 can be read as an effort at making its texts and 
practices transparent (a contemporary trend among other financial institutions as well, such as central 
banks, ALAN S. BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION 5 (2004)). In it, the Club insisted that “[k]ey 
elements such as membership, working practices and the structure of Paris Club agreements were 
already in place by the early 1970s, when the Paris Club’s activity was much lower than in subsequent 
decades . . . . [T]he fact that its key features have not changed significantly can be seen as proof of their 
consistency and one of the reasons explaining the Club’s longevity.” PARIS CLUB, ANNUAL REPORT 37 
(2007). It then summarized five “key principles” aimed at “maximum efficiency.” Id. at 40. Through 
statements like these, the reader is invited to view the Club as a rational organization easily understood 
in context-independent, referential terms. 
 79. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40. 
DEEB 11/25/2010 
Fall 2010] CONSTRUCTING RESTRUCTURING 127 
ideology to place the minister on an even footing with his audience early on.80 
He also can leverage that even footing at the end of the speech to voice the 
Iraqi people’s emotional suffering as something stronger than a plea for grace. 
Moreover, the professional ground occupied by lawyers permits them to 
intervene in and even become part of narratives broader than those of single 
clients. With respect to the sovereign debt restructuring field, in 2009, the 
government of Ecuador’s decision to default on foreign debt payments despite 
outside perception that it had the means to make its payments triggered a stern 
rebuke from Ecuador’s erstwhile sovereign debt counsel (who, incidentally, was 
also Iraq’s). The press picked the story up as one of a “godfather” and 
“institution” banishing the black sheep to preserve the credit-worthiness of the 
rest of the flock.81 In his own co-authored article assessing the Ecuadorian 
move, the attorney traced the country’s ostensible legal justification to the 
revival of the odious debt doctrine in the Iraqi debt restructuring.82 That is, the 
Ecuadorians seized upon the revival of the odious debts narrative to alter the 
legal terms of their situation. Their critics responded partly by rejecting that 
narrative and seeking others to describe the Ecuadorian action. Even this brief 
sketch of competing narratives—odious debt versus black sheep—hints at a 
language ideological pattern to each side’s justifications that parallels the Iraqi 
case. Attunement to patterns like this one can help practitioners stay ahead. 
Narrative tactics emerge along the fault lines of broader social practices.83 The 
Ecuadorian maneuver was possible because lenders opened a contractual 
loophole years earlier when they dropped longstanding prohibitions on 
borrowers repurchasing their own obligations, which allowed Ecuador to drive 
down the price of its debt by defaulting and then scooping up the devalued 
assets.84 “The justification, if there was one,” Ecuador’s former counsel writes 
about what in retrospect looks like lenders’ naiveté in creating the loophole, 
“must have been that no sovereign bond issuer would risk its market reputation 
by deliberately defaulting in order to manipulate the price of its bond to its own 
benefit.”85 Lawyers are keenly attentive to such isolated rational deduction, as 
well as warily sensitive to emotional arguments. Developing awareness as to 
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how both unfold together in legal narrative can improve the depth of focus of 
the profession’s habitual instrumentalist thinking.86 For those who share Cover’s 
concern with justice, it may also illuminate ways to employ the ancient practice 
of narrative persuasively in service of reform. 
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